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THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF SUBROGATION
By JAMES MORFIT MULLEN*
Subrogation is a principle conceived in equity. It is a
doctrine of great importance and of extensive application.
The etymology of the term, from two Latin words, "sub"
meaning "under" and "rogare" meaning "to ask" indi-
cates the origin of this doctrine in the Civil Law. This, of
course, explains its origin as an equitable doctrine.
One of the dictionary definitions is :'
"In Law the act or operation of law in vesting a
person who has satisfied, or is ready to satisfy, a claim
which ought to be borne by another with the right to
hold and enforce the claim against such other for his
own indemnification."
The best generally known synonym for the word is "sub-
stitution", or an assignment by operation of law. A con-
cise statement of what is connoted by the word is :2
"Subrogation is simply a method of preventing un-
just enrichment."
Mr. Justice Miller in a leading case in the Supreme Court
of the United States describes the doctrine a little more
fully in the following language :$
"The doctrine of subrogation is derived from the
civil law, and 'It is said to be a legal fiction, by force of
which an obligation extinguished by a payment made
by a third person is treated as still subsisting for the
* Of the Baltimore City bar. A. B., 1899, Johns Hopkins University;
LL.B., 1906, University of Maryland.
1 Century Dictionary.
2Note (1913) 26 Narv. L. Rev. 380; Note (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 381.
3 Aetna L. Ins. Co. v. Middleport, 124 U. S. 534, 538-9, 31 L. Ed. 537, 542.
8 S. Ct. 625, 629-30 (1888).
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benefit of this third person, so that by means of it one
creditor is substituted to the rights, remedies, and se-
curities of another.... It takes place for the-benefit
of a person who, being himself a creditor, pays another
creditor whose debt is preferred to his by reason of privi-
leges or mortgages, being obliged to make the payment,
either as standing in the situation of a surety, or that he
may remove a prior incumbrance from the property on
which he relies to secure his payment. Subrogation,
as a matter of right, independently of agreement, takes
place only for the benefit of insurers; or of one who,
being himself a creditor, has satisfied the lien of a prior
creditor; or for the benefit of a purchaser who has ex-
tinguished an incumbrance upon the estate which he
has purchased; or of a co-obligor or surety who has
paid the debt which ought, in whole or in part, to have
been met by another.' Sheldon, Subrogation, pp. 2, 3.
"In section 240 it is said: 'The doctrine of subro-
gation is not applied for -the mere stranger or volunteer,
who has paid the debt of another, without any assign-
ment or agreement for subrogation, without being un-
der any legal obligation to make the payment, and with-
out being compelled to do so for the preservation of any
rights or property of his own.' "
The text writers say that subrogation arises in two in-
stances, first, legal, that is by operation of law; and, second,
conventional, that is by contract or acts of the parties. A
third classification can be properly added in Maryland be-
cause of the rights given to subrogation by statute. Dis-
cussion of the subject, therefore, will be under these three
heads.
LEGAL SUBROGATION
This branch of the topic is one that merits the most com-
ment, as the other two might properly be dealt with under
other subjects. The word "Legal" is, of course, here used
as distinguished from the other two classes, "Conventional"
and "Statutory". It is not used in contra-distinetion to
"Equitable".
Subrogation is perhaps more easily conceived in connec-
tion with specific instances, of which the two following are
typical:
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1. A has a second mortgage on the realty of B. The
taxes on the property are in default. In order to prevent
the state from selling the property for the tax lien, A is
compelled to pay these charges. If later there is a sale
by way of foreclosure of the first mortgage, and if this sale
produces funds insufficient to pay even the first mortgage,
then under the principal of subrogation A is entitled to be
reimbursed for what he paid for taxes before the claim of
the first mortgagee is satisfied.
2. Perhaps the greatest class of cases in which rights
of subrogation are enforced involves payment by sureties.
A typical instance of the application of this right arises
where A was surety for B's obligation to the State. A is
compelled to pay B's obligation. A, having paid the State,
becomes thereupon subrogated to any rights that the State
may have as creditor of B. Therefore, if A as subrogee of
the State files a suit to recover for the State's rights to
which he is subrogated and the claim has not been enforced
for more than three years, A, the surety, is not bound by the
statute of limitations, because the principles of subrogation
confer upon A the State's exemption from the operation of
the statute of limitations.
The essential ingredients of the legal right of subro-
gation are, therefore, two:
1. The person claiming subrogation must have an in-
terest to protect, and be not merely a volunteer.
2. The right of subrogation exists as to such persons
by operation of law without the creditor's consent and even
against his wishes.
The principal discussion of the subject arises in connec-
tion with the persons entitled to assert the right. All the
authorities state that a mere volunteer cannot claim subro-
gation. The difficulty, of course, is in determining who is a
volunteer. The following quotation from a law review dis-
cussion of general application shows the difficulty of the
question by saying :'
"The term is usually applied to any person who is
refused subrogation."
Note (1913) 26 Harv. L. Rev. 261.
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The most satisfactory method, therefore, of determining
who are included and who are excluded by the term is to deal
with the specific classes of cases in which subrogation has
been permitted or refused.
General Creditors
Considering the right of a general creditor from the
point of view of the origin of the doctrine of subrogation to
prevent unjust enrichment, and also from some of the deci-
sions on the subject in Louisiana, where the Civil Law still
prevails, it would seem to be good law to state as a general
proposition (but not necessarily as Maryland law) that a
general creditor is as much entitled to the right as someone
holding a lien or claiming in some other capacity. In
Louisiana there are some decisions where this phase of the
matter is discussed and the court of last resort, as well as
the Circuit Court of Appeals for that Circuit have deter-
mined that a general creditor is entitled to the right of sub-
rogation under appropriate circumstances."
In the Zeigler case the court decides in favor of the gen-
eral creditors' rights in the following language :6
"The theory of this, subrogation is that the creditor
of inferior rank, in making the payment to the mort-
gage creditor, has an interest in the property of the
common debtor, the pledge of both creditors. Until the
superior mortgage debt is discharged, the creditor of
inferior rank gets nothing. He is concerned, therefore,
in making that payment of the superior debt which pre-
vents a sacrifice of the common pledge, and affords the
creditor who makes the payment the opportunity to
make the property bring enough to pay and have a
surplus after the superior debt is satisfied. The whole
reasoning on which this legal subrogation rests, points
to the ordinary creditor as entitled to it, and excludes
the contention that the legal subrogation is restricted
to the second or third mortgage. The reason of the
subrogation in favor of the creditor whose mortgage is
inferior exists, with equal if not greater force in favor
of the ordinary creditor whose payment stops the sacri-
5 Zeigler v. His Creditors, 49 La. Ann. 187, 21 So. 666 (1896) ; Iberville
Planting, Etc., Co. v. Monongahela, 168 Fed. 12 (C. C. A. 5th 1909).
0 Ziegler v. His Creditors, 49 La. Ann. 187, 188, 21 So. 666 (1896).
[VOL. III
SUBROGATION
fice of the property under the writ of the superior
creditor. In Boileux, Toullier, Marcade, and others of
the French commentators, we find the most emphatic
recognition of this subrogation of the ordinary credi-
tors."
7
In Maryland the law seems to be at variance with what
is outlined above. In McNiece v. Eliasons a general credi-
tor of a decedent's estate filed a bill against a mortgagee to
be allowed to. pay off the mortgage and to be subrogated to
its lien. A demurrer to the bill was sustained on the ground
that the general creditor had no such right. Judge Fowler
in rendering the opinion of the Court uses the following
language :?
"There can be no doubt upon the general question
here involved. The doctrine is thus expressed by Mr.
Pomeroy (3 Eq. Juris., Sec. 1212) 'The payment must
be made by or on behalf of a person who has some in-
terest in the premises, or some claim against other
parties which he is entitled in equity to have pro-
tected'."
The Maryland Court of Appeals, however, had previ-
ously accorded the right of subrogation under facts which
are no, more compelling than in the case of a general cred-
itor. In Robertson v. Mowell,10 the sister of M had paid
direct to the mortgagee of M's land a part of the mortgage.
She did so, if not by the express previous request of her
brother, yet with his knowledge and his acquiescence there-
in, and with the full understanding and agreement between
them that when she had paid the whole mortgage debt she
7 The author of this article had a vigorously contested case in the Fed-
eral Court of Maryland, in which the right of a general creditor was liti-
gated and decided in his favor. The case was argued twice in the Circuit
Court of Appeals, as at the conclusion of the first argument, apparently
the court was not able to decide it upon the case as then submitted. Even-
tually, the rights of the general creditors were established to get reim-
bursement from the assets of the bankrupt manufacturing corporation, a
total of $35,000., which was advanced to the corporation when it was in
failing circumstances, for the purpose of satisfying an income tax claim.
Guaranty Trust Company of New York v. Carl R. McKenrick, et al., 5 Fed.
(2nd) 553 (C. C. A. 4th 1925).
8 McNiece v. Eliason, 78 Md. 168, 27 A. 940 (1894).
"Ibd, 78 Md. 168, 176.
1 66 Md. 530, 8 A. 273 (1887).
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was to have the mortgage assigned to her as her security.
The Court allowed her subrogation to the extent of the pay-
ments she had made and outlined the principles involved in
the following language :11
"It is true, she was under no legal obligation to
make this payment, but under the circumstances stated
she cannot be regarded as a mere stranger or volunteer
officiously intermeddling with a matter which in no way
concerned her. There are no intervening incumbrances
or rights of creditors to be interfered with, nor any
superior or equal equities to be displaced. In the case
referred to the court said: 'The law of substitution
is not founded on contract or agreement, but upon the
equitable powers of the court. It is in the nature of
equitable relief to protect a meritorious creditor, who
had paid the debt of another, against loss or damage.'
In most cases it is applied in behalf of one who is under
an obligation of some kind to pay the debt of another, as
a surety who is obliged to pay the debt of his principal,
or one who is obliged to pay a lien or incumbrance on
property purchased by him. 'But', say the court, 'it
is not necessarily confined to these cases, but may be
applied on equitable principles in behalf of one who
at the instance and request of the debtor, pays a lien or
incumbrance which he was under no legal obligation to
pay, provided it does not interfere with intervening
rights and incumbrances.' In our opinion, Mrs. Davis
must be regarded as such meritorious creditor of herbrother, to the extent of the payment on the mortgage
debt thus made by her, and that this is a case which
clearly falls within this equitable doctrine of substitu-
tion. " I
Most of the other cases in which the right of subrogation
is allowed are clearly outlined and may be generally classi-
fied as listed below.
Rights of a Surety
The subrogation rights accorded a surety as above out-
lined comprise probably the largest class of cases. This
class will be more particularly discussed below, because a
surety's right in Maryland is enforced by virtue of a statute
11 Ibid, 66 Md. 530, 538.
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passed in 1763, which will be dealt with later under the third
topic. However, as generally typifying the right accorded
the subrogee, attention is here directed to Orem v. Wright-
son,12 which is a leading case in Maryland and in the law
generally.
Other Persons Entitled to Right
Eliminating general creditors, and bearing in mind the
general application of the doctrine of subrogation, which is
an equitable principle to prevent unjust enrichment, there
are many classes of cases established by numerous decisions
of the Maryland Court of Appeals, wherein persons are en-
titled to be substituted to a creditor's- rights under the sub-
rogation doctrine.
A well established class of cases is that of junior or
subsequent lienors, whose rights have been passed upon in
several cases. i8 This class also includes the lien of vendors.
Executors, administrators and trustees who over-pay
obligations of the estate are subrogated to the rights of
creditors thus paid.14
A tenant in common, or a life tenant who pays a prece-
dent obligation on property owned in common, or subject
to the remainder, is entitled to the right of subrogation.11
A widow who pays off a vendor's lien from the proceeds
of devises and bequests (which are prior to the claims of
general creditors) is subrogated to the rights of the cred-
itors thus paid off.'0
When a bank paid to the receiver of an insolvent firm the
firm's deposits in the bank, and for payment of the bank's
loan retained certain collateral securities, which were
found to be the property of customers of the insolvent firm,
12 51 Md. 34, 34 A. R. 286 (1878).
13 Reigle v. Leiter, 8 Md. 399, 405, 63 A. D. 705 (1855) ; Price v. Hobbs,
47 Md. 359 (1877) ; Reimler v. Pflngsten, 28 A. 24 (Md. 1893) ; Wurlitzer
Company v. Cohen, 156 Md. 368, 144 A. 641, 62 A. L. R. 358 (1928) ; Milhol-
land v. Tiffany, 64 Md. 455, 2 A. 831 (1885).
" Billingslea v. Henry, 20 Md. 282 (1862) ; State v. Graham, 115 Md. 520,
81 A. 31 (1911) ; Carroll v. Bowling, 151 Md. 59, 133 A. 851 (1926) ; Elliott
v. Elliott, 6 G. & J. 35 (1832).
15 Hogan v. McMahon, 115 Md. 195, 80 A. 695, A. C. 1912C 126 (1911);
Meyers v. Building Asso., 139 Md. 607, 116 A. 453 (1921) ; Parsons v. Urie,
104 Md. 238, 64 A. 927, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 559 (1906).l Durham v. Rhodes, 23 Md. 233 (1865).
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the owners of the collateral were entitled to be subrogated
to the bank's right to a lien upon the deposits surrendered
by the bank to the receiver. 17
Similarly, when bonds were issued and sold, secured by
a deed of trust, with the understanding that the property
to be acquired from their proceeds was' to be conveyed to
the trustee under the deed of trust for their security, though
the deed of trust securing such bonds was invalid, the hold-
ers of the bonds were entitled to be s.ubrogated to the lien
of other deeds of trusts of the same property to the extent
that such proceeds were used for the stated purpose. 8
Even in the case of conveyances set aside because fraud-
ulent, if a grantee pays cash as part of the consideration
for the transfer, such grantee is entitled to be subrogated to
the rights of creditors of the fraudulent grantor to the ex-
tent that such cash consideration is used for payment of
the claims of such creditors.19
When a third person lends money to a tenant in common
for improvements to realty at the request of the other ten-
ant, such a person is subrogated to the rights of the co-ten-
ants, and is entitled to a lien on the realty for the amount so
expended.20
While there are no decisions in Maryland on the subject,
under the general principles above referred to, it seems to
be good law that where an agent acting in good faith and for
the benefit of the principal, but without authority, has in-
curred obligations, or made payments for the benefit of the
principal, the agent is subrogated to the rights of those
whose claims have been so paid.21
Limitations on the Right
The right of subrogation, with its origin in the Civil Law,
is merely an equitable right. It is not enforced at the ex-
pense of a legal right.22 In this State the Court of Appeals
1 Records v. McKin, 115 Md. 222, 80 A. 899 (1911).
2' Orrick v. Fidelity & Deposit Company, 113 Md. 239, 77 A. 599 (1910).
19 Chatterton v. Mason, 86 Md. 236, 37 A. 960 (1897); Cone v. Cross, 72
Md. 102, 19 A. 391 (1889).
2 "Williams v. Harlan, 88 Md. 1, 41 A. 51, 71 A. S. R. 394 (1898).
21 1 Mechem, Agency, 1198.
22 Sheldon, Subrogation, 5-6.
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in a number of cases has enunciated the principles just
stated, and has refused substitution ". . when by so doing
it will work an injury upon other persons by destroying
their legal or equitable rights. 2 3
From the above, it is clear that the right of subrogation
is not granted against a superior equity or a legal right,
but that a judgment creditor has no such superior equity
as entitles him to the benefit of this principle.24
It would hardly seem necessary to cite authorities for
the statement that if the creditor in connection with whose
rights subrogation is claimed has no rights thus to be
equitably conveyed to the person claiming subrogation, no
right of subrogation can arise.25
Subrogation being a right to which a person claiming it
is substituted by virtue of equitable principles, this right
exists as to securities, which the creditor did not have or
did not know about at the time his obligation was in-
curred.6
Extent of the Right
This phase of the matter could probably be summarily
disposed of by saying that the equitable doctrine of subro-
gation when applied accords to the subrogated person all
of the rights of the creditor to which the subrogee becomes
thus entitled. But there are several decisions by the Mary-
land Court of Appeals worthy of special comment in indi-
cating the manner in which the right of subrogation is dis-
pensed.
This is particularly of interest in connection with the
subrogation rights conferred when the State is the creditor
whose rights are thus equitably assigned. A second mort-
gage creditor in paying off the first mortgage could thus
unquestionably protect his interest by taking an assignment
23 Holt v. State Roads Commission, 124 Md. 66, 91 A. 874 (1914) ; Snook
v. Zentmyer, 91 Md. 485, 46 A. 1008 (1900); Milbolland v. Tiffany, 64 Md.
455, 2 A. 831 (1885) ; Niedig v. Whiteford, 29 Md. 178 (1868) ; Green v.
Western National Bank, 86 Md. 279, 38 A. 131 (1897).
2, Grangers' Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Farmers National Bank,
164 Md. 441, 165 A. 185 (1932).
25 Poe v. Philadelphia Casualty Company, 118 Md. 347, 84 A. 476 (1912).2 B. & 0. R. R. Co. v. Trimble, 51 Md. 99 (1878).
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from the holder of the first mortgage, provided the holder
of the first mortgage, as would normally be the case, is
agreeable to executing such a paper. In dealing with the
State as creditor, however, there is normally no accredited
agent from whom an assignment could be secured. For
instance, if a tax claim is thus paid off, there is no one from
whom an assignment can be secured. The right of subro-
gation must, therefore, follow, if at all, from the application
of settled principles.. The leading Maryland decision on
this question is the one in which the creditor was accorded
the State's exemption from the application of the statute
Of limitations to it. 27
We are also familiar with cases in which a Federal Gov-
ernment lien by reason of an income tax liability or a State's
priority in the distribution of the assets of a decedent's
estate devolves upon the subrogee. 8
Two other Maryland cases show interesting circum-
stances in which subrogation was allowed.
In Packham v. German Fire Insurance Company,29 an
insurance company had become subrogated to the rights of
an insurer by paying his fire insurance loss claims on furni-
ture and fixtures. The rights to which the insurance com-
pany was subrogated (of course, those of the insured) com-
prised a claim against a third person tort feasor, who by a
negligent fire had destroyed or damaged the insured's furni-
ture and fixtures and merchandise, and caused him a loss of
profits. The insurance covered the furniture and fixtures
only and had nothing to, do with the merchandise and loss
of profits. The insured endeavored to handle his claim
against the tort feasor in such a way that he could therein
by settlement recover against the latter for the loss of mer-
chandise and loss of profits, but not for the furniture and
fixtures. In connection with this, he sued the insurance
company, but the appellate court, applying the equitable
doctrine of subrogation to the circumstances, felt -that there
27 American Bonding Company v. Mechanics Bank, 97 Md. 598, 55 A. 395,
99 A. S. R. 466 (1903).
28 Guaranty Trust Company v. McKenrick, 5 Fed. (2nd) 553 (C. C. A. 4th
1925) ; Orem v. Wrightson, 51 Md. 34, 34 A. R. 286 (1878).
91 Md. 515, 46 A. 1066, 80 A. S. R. 461, 50 L. R. A. 828 (1900).
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could be no recovery, as by reason of having disentitled him-
self to sue against the tort feasor for loss of furniture and
fixtures, he had thus voluntarily destroyed a right to which
his insurer was entitled under the equitable doctrine of sub-
rogation, and the insurer's right of recovery for his dam-
ages, being an indivisible right, he could not recover against
the fire insurance company.
The case of Western Maryland Railway Company v.
Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation,"0 is in prin-
ciple analogous to the case just cited. The insurer had
there paid compensation awarded an injured workman. The
railway company (or its controlled subsidiary) was claimed
to be responsible as tort feasor. Article 101, section 58, of
the Maryland Code gave the right of subrogation to the
Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation upon payment
of the injured workman's claim, and gave it the primary
right to sue the tort feasor, but also provided that when this
claim was satisfied, any excess recovered belonged to the
injured man.
The railway company tried to settle the injured man's
claim, and had actually paid him therefor, but refused to
make any settlement with the Employers' Liability Assur-
ance Corporation, claiming that it had the right to deal di-
rectly with the injured man, and owed nothing to the insur-
ance company.
In an injunction suit, the appellate court held in sub-
stance that the right against the third party liable, to which
the insurance company was by statute subrogated, was an
entirety and that having recognized its liability to the in-
jured workman by making a payment to him, the railway
company had to this extent paid the injured workman money
belonging to the subrogated insurance company, and that,
therefore, the prayer of the bill demanding an injunction
was proper.
Necessity for a Demand
As outlined above, the subrogee is entitled to his right
whether or not he knows of it at the time of his incurring a
80 163 Md. 97, 161 A. 5 (1932).
1939]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
liability, or whether or not the security that he is claiming
may thereafter accrue.
But there are two cases that deal with demands in special
facts. Stump v. Warfield 1 was an ejectment suit, and a de-
fense was made by way of a plea on equitable grounds.
There was a claim for subrogation under circumstances that
dealt more particularly with different mortgage rights. The
Court said :82
"Under no principle of equity could they be subro-
gated for such purposes or on such terms, but if entitled
to be subrogated at all, it would only be to the extent
of that mortgage, and in order to have made this plea a
valid one on that theory, it should at least have alleged
that they had made demand on the plaintiffs for the
amount of that mortgage, which had been refused, or
show their willingness to have surrendered the prop-
erty upon payment thereof."
On the other hand, in Heighe v. Evans8 where the holder
of a part interest in an equity of redemption as part of his
subrogation rights wanted to pay off the mortgagee's claim,
he had no right to demand an assignment of the mortgage.
The case in question turned upon the factual issue of
whether or not the person claiming the right of subrogation
had made a condition of his tender a demand for an assign-
ment of the mortgage. The foreclosure sale questioned by
this litigation was sustained, because the tender of payment
was conditioned upon an assignment being given; and such
a tender must be unconditional. The purport of the deci-
sion seems to be that one properly asking subrogation to the
lien of a mortgage is so entitled as a matter of right, and
there is no necessity as a condition of the demand to re-
quest that a written assignment be executed.
Where Subrogation Is Refused
What has been outlined above doubtless makes clear the
principles underlying the granting in equity of the right
of subrogation, but as supplementing these settled prin-
u 104 Md. 530, 65 A. 346, 118 A. S. R. 434 (1906).
as Ibid, 104 Md. 530, 550.
83 164 Md. 259, 164 A. 671, 93 A. L. R. 81 (1932).
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ciples there are several decisions by the Maryland Court
of Appeals further illustrating the negative side of the sub-
rogation doctrine.
A recent case is Harford Bank v. Hopper's Estate.8 1 A
bank claimed subrogation. It had made loans to the sole
heir of a deceased person, who was also the administrator.
The proceeds of the bank's loans had been used by the bor-
rower to pay off creditors of the decedent's estate, but the
borrower was under no compulsion so to do, and the bank
had no understanding that the loans were to be used for this
purpose. It was held that subrogation could not be al-
lowed. The Court said :35
"To the same effect, in 60 C. J., 716, it is said: 'The
payor must have acted on compulsion, and it is only in
cases where the person paying the debt of another will
be liable in the event of a default, or is compelled to pay
in order to protect his own interests, or by virtue of
legal process, that equity substitutes him in the place of
the creditor without any agreement to that effect; in
other cases the debt is absolutely extinguished.' "
In two other cases3 6 it was held that where a third party,
who was in no way connected with a mortgage, lends money
to the mortgagor on the latter's credit and takes no assign-
ment of the mortgage, such person is not entitled to the right
of .subrogation of the mortgage lien against a subsequent
mortgage.
Subrogation Claims Arising in Law Cases
There is no clear decision or statement in Maryland as
to how far equitable doctrines apply in the law courts.
Sheldon, the foremost text writer on Subrogation, does not
deal with this subject, but contents himself with the general
statement that subrogation is an equitable right.8 7
"169 Md. 314, 181 A. 751 (1935).
"Ibid, 169 Md. 314, 325.
"Virginia v. C. & 0. Canal Co., 32 Md. 501 (1870) ; Swan v. Patterson,
7 Md. 164 (1854).
87 One of the encyclopedias collects cases showing a diversity of opinion
as to whether or not the right of subrogation can be claimed or adminis-
tered in law cases. 60 C. J. 824. Sheldon, Subrogation, 5-.
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It is noteworthy that in one of the leading Maryland
decisions, 8 an insurance company, entitled to assert the
right of a creditor, to whose rights it became subrogated by
payment of the claim, sought affirmative enforcement of its
rights in a court of equity. 'The right in question, however,
was a breach of trust. There was no discussion in the opin-
ion on the question of equitable jurisdiction vel non.
There are, however, several decisions in Maryland show-
ing a trend towards permitting litigation of the right of
subrogation in law cases under appropriate pleadings. In
Packham v. German Fire Insurance Co., 9 the right of sub-
rogation was asserted by the insurance company as an af-
firmative defense in an action at law. A special plea setting
out the facts was then filed and was held to be a sufficient
answer to the case. This plea, the record shows, was not
filed by way of defense on equitable grounds.
Again, in Maryland Trust Company v. Poffenberger,"
the defense of subrogation was raised by a special plea on
equitable grounds in an action at law. The suit was brought
on the indorsement of a promissory note. The refusal of
subrogation was claimed as a defense. It was held to be.
insufficient, as the claim of the right by the defendant an-
nexed as a part thereof conditions which the equitable doc-
trine of subrogation did not permit. The defense so pleaded
was held not to be an answer to the case.
In Stump v. Warfield, 4 1 an action of ejectment was
brought to recover possession of a tract of land. A defense
was made by way of plea on equitable grounds, in which a
right of subrogation was claimed. The claimed right was
held improper under the circumstances of the case, which
have been referred to above.
In the first two cases there was no discussion as to the
propriety of litigating questions of subrogation in a law
court. But, in Stump v. Warfield, the Court said, after
discussing the merits of the defense of subrogation :42
38 American Bonding Company v. Mechanics Bank, 97 Md. 598, 55 A. 395,
99 A. S. R. 466 (1903).
'p91 Md. 515, 46 A. 1066, 80 A. S. R. 461, 50 L. R. A. 828 (1900).156 Md. 200, 144 A. 249, 62 A. L. R. 546 (1928).
41 104 Md. 530, 65 A. 346, 118 A. S. R. 434 (1906).
42 Ibid, 104 Md. 530, 532.
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"The peculiar circumstances of this case are such
that it would have been almost impossible to properly set
up the claim of subrogation by the plea on equitable
grounds, so as to do justice between the parties." I
In the leading case of Orem v. Wrightson," the right of
subrogation was allowed in the Orphans' Court. Also, in
bankruptcy there is no doubt but that subrogation rights
may be fully claimed."'
We point out below in this article the two situations in
which subrogation is allowed in Maryland by statute. In
both of them this right is asserted fully in actions at law.
In one of them, giving sureties the right to proceed upon
their claim at law, the appellate court has held46 that a
surety must proceed under the statute and cannot legally
recover the money paid by him in a suit in the name of the
obligee against himself and his co-obligor.
Under the statute in Maryland,47 providing for the gen-
eral qualifications of declarations in actions at law, there is
the following stipulation:
"... provided, that every action for damages
wherein the judgment or any part thereof, which may
be recoverable, shall inure to the benefit of any person
claiming the same by reason of subrogation, shall be
prosecuted in the name or names of the real party or
parties in interest so claiming by subrogation; and
upon petition of any defendant to said suit or action,
the Court shall order any person having such right by
subrogation to be made a party plaintiff."
It will appear from the above that plaintiffs in actions
at law when claiming by way of subrogation are required
to reveal fully the connections of all parties with the case.
There is a significant absence, however, of any obligation on
the part of substituted or actual defendants to file of record
on the pleadings their real connection with the case. Thus,
4851 Md. 34, 34 A. R. 286 (1878).
"Guaranty Trust Company v. McKenrick, 5 Fed. (2nd) 553 (C. C. A.
4th 1925).
I "Md. Code, Art. 8, Sec. 5.
16 Martindale v. Brock, 41 Md. 571 (1874).
17 Md. Code, Art. 75, Sec. 3.
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insurance companies litigating on behalf of defendants the
many automobile accidents are in complete obscurity.
Looking at the matter as an entirety, the author ven-
tures the opinion that in Maryland there would probably
be no case in an action at law where the question at issue
was only of subrogation, in which the Maryland Court of
Appeals would not, under appropriate pleadings, permit
complete litigation of subrogation rights. This is said in
spite of what was decided in Stump v. Warfield. The issue
in this case was remitted to an equity court for an adjudica-
tion of the rights involved. This was by reason of the fact
that a law court in an action of ejectment could not deal
adequately with the complex rights of the various parties
concerned in the case.
CONVENTIONAL SUBROGATION
Conventional subrogation can arise in many instances.
It is said to be synonymous with assignment.48  As such, a
discussion of the principles involved more properly belongs
to the latter subject. Thus, transposing one of the in-
stances given above, if A as holder of a second mortgage
on the property of B pays off the first mortgage, and has it
assigned to him by the first mortgagee, the rights claimed
would be adjudicated on the basis of the written assignment
and not by virtue of any principle of equitable subrogation. 9
There are, however, some decisions in the Maryland
Court of Appeals of which brief mention might here prop-
erly be made. Probably the most numerous cases in which
rights of conventional subrogation arise in Maryland are
under the specific provisions of fire insurance policies. For
instance, the present standard fire insurance policy used in
the State of Maryland, and in some other States, contains at
its conclusion the following provision:
"This Company may require from the insured an
assignment of all right of recovery against any party
for loss, or damage to the extent that payment therefor
is made by this Company."
4f 60 C. J. 704.
Alexander v. Fidelity & Deposit Company, 108 Md. 541, 70 A. 209
(1908).
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This provision is, in view of the nature of the fire insur-
ance contract as one of indemnity, merely declaratory of the
common law, but as the subject of an express stipulation in
the contract is, of course, a right by way of conventional
subrogation. 50
In Svea Assurance Co. v. Packham,51 under "the pecu-
liar circumstances of this case" the right of subrogation
was refused the insurance company because one company
of eight or nine insurers on the risk wanted to block the
right of subrogation claimed by all the other insurers, and
the Court held that that decision was an exception to the
general rule that the release of wrongdoers by the insured
makes him liable to the insurer for the amount paid.
There are four decisions in Maryland litigating various
questions arising in connection with the standard mortgage
forms upon fire insurance policies. The principal clause of
this somewhat extended policy form affixed to fire insurance
contracts when the mortgagee is the insured, is a stipulation
in substance that any default in the contract of insurance
on the part of the mortgagor does not defeat the rights of
the mortgagee under the policy. These decisions pertain
more particularly to questions of mortgage and fire insur-
ance law.2
STATUTORY SUBROGATION
Subrogation of Employer and Insurer Paying
Injured Employee.
By the provisions of Article 101, section 58 of the Mary-
land Code, where the employer (and insurer) pays the com-
pensation awarded by the State Industrial Accident Com-
mission to an injured workman, if the accident to the work-
man grows out of circumstances creating a legal liability
"0 Baltimore American Underwriters v. Beckley, 173 Md. 202, 195 A. 550
(1937), in which a right was enforced.
6192 Md. 464, 48 A. 359, 52 L. R. A. 95 (1901), growing out of the same
facts as Packham v. German Fire Insurance Co., 91 Md. 515, 46 A. 1066.
80 A. S. R. 461, 50 L. R. A. 828 (1900).
52 Frontier Mortgage Company v. Heft, 146 Md. 1, 125 A. 772 (1924);
Royal Insurance Company v. Drury, 150 Md. 211, 132 A. 635, 45 A. L. R. 582(1925); Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Dilworth, 167 Md. 232, 173 A. 22
(1934); Grangers' Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Farmers National Bank,
164 Md. 441, 165 A. 185 (1932).
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in some third person, the employer (and his insurer) may
enforce for their benefit the liability of such third person.
The section makes further detailed provisions as to the
rights thus created by statute, but the insurer has been
determined to have a first lien upon the proceeds of the re-
covery for its payments under the award.
This Maryland statute is of interest, because the other
forty-seven States in the Union have dealt with this situa-
tion in many different ways. In some of them the only re-
covery against the third person is what the insurer has paid.
There is no allowance to the injured workman in the event
of a recovery over and above the compensation insurance
paid. It is hardly within the scope of this article to deal
with these varying provisions.
Workmen's Compensation insurance is a contract of in-
demnity. In Maryland the rights of the insurer are crystal-
lized by this statute. It has been held that this section does
not create a new liability, but merely designates the manner
of enforcing a liability already existing and changes the
parties benefited.53
Subrogation of Sureties
Article 8, Section 5, of the Maryland Code provides qs
follows:
"The surety in any bond or other obligation for the
payment of money or promissory note, or the endorser
of any protested bill of exchange, who shall pay or
tender the money due thereon, whether the whole be due
or part has been previously paid, shall be entitled to
an assignment, maintain an action in his own name
against the principal debtor."
A surety's right to subrogation exists independently
of statute and this act, originally enacted in 1763,"' is merely
declaratory of the common law.55
5 Clough & Malloy v. Shilling, -149 Md. 189, 131 A. 343 (1925). Many
other decisions are cited under this statute In the 2nd volume of the Code
and in the 1935 supplement. It would serve no useful purpose to list them
here.
1' Md. Laws 1763, Ch. 23, Secs. 7, 8.
55 Watkins v. Worthington, 2 Bland 509 (1828).
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Generally above, in connection with the right of subro-
gation, apart from statute, we have outlined the extent of
the rights of a surety paying the debt. 6
In American Bonding Company v. Mechanics Bank, the
Maryland Appellate Court, in outlining the extent of the
right of subrogation to rights and remedies against third
parties, uses the following language:"
"That the doctrine of subrogation does go to the
extent of giving to the surety, who has paid the debt of
the principal, the benefit of the rights and remedies of
the creditor against all persons who were liable for the
debt is both asserted by text writers and sustained by
the authority of many decided cases. . . . This is espe-
cially held to be true of the sureties of a fiduciary who
are compelled to answer for his breach of trust and
they have repeatedly been subrogated to the rights and
remedies of both the trustee and the cestui que trust
against the fiduciary and those participating in the
wrongful act."
One settled principle in connection with the surety's
right to subrogation is that the surety must pay the whole
debt to be entitled to this right. A surety cannot demand
a pro tanto assignment. 8
The surety's right of subrogation is not limited to rela-
tions of a formal suretyship, but applies to all persons upon
whom there is a fixed liability, whether surety, endorser, ac-
ceptor or guarantor, to pay a debt which was due, and which
the principal debtor ought to pay. 9
In the case of Maryland Trust Company v. Poffen-
berger,60 the Maryland appellate court refuses the applica-
tion of the right of subrogation in a case where the surety
demanded a security to which he was not entitled.
As outlined above, a surety is entitled to the benefit of
the creditor's security even though he did not know of its
'The leading case is Orem v. Wrightson, 51 Md. 34, 34 A. R. 286 (1878).
5'97 Md. 598, 606, 55 A. 395, 99 A. S. R. 466 (1903).
s Neptune Ins. Co. v. Dorsey, 3 Md. Ch. 334 (1850) ; Swan v. Patterson,
7 Md. 164 (1854); Parrott v. Chestertown Bank, 88 Md. 515, 41 A. 1067
(1893); Grove v. Brien, 1 Md. 438 (1852); Hollingsworth v. Floyd, 2 H. &
G. 87 (1827).5 Dinsmore v. Sachs, 133 Md. 437, 105 A. 524 (1918).
60156 Md. 200, 144 A. 249, 62 A. L. R. 546 (1928).
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existence, or even if it was taken after the date of the surety-
ship contract.61
Generally, in discussing the right of subrogation at law,
attention should be directed to the case of Martindale v.
Brock,6 2 in which the proper way for a surety to assert his
right at law was decided by the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals.63
01 Freeny v. Yingling, 37 Md. 491 (1872).
6241 Md. 571 (1874).
e The following are decisions dealing generally with cases of suretyship
and the right of a surety to be subrogated to the creditor's rights. None of
them calls for any particular comment. Snook v. Munday, 96 Md. 514, 54
A. 77 (1903) ; Fuhrman v. Fuhrman, 115 Md. 436, 80 A. 1082 (1911) ; Wal-
lace v. Jones, 110 Md. 143, 72 A. 769 (1909) ; Ghlselin v. Fergusson, 4 H. &
J. 522 (1811); Hollingsworth v. Floyd, 2 H. & G. 87 (1827); Sotheren's
Lessee v. Reed, 4 H. & J. 307 (1811) ; Norwood v. Norwood, 2 H. & J. 525
(1804) ; Wilson v. Rldgely, 46 Md. 235 (1877) ; Peacock v. Pembroke, 8 Md.
348 (1855) ; Grove v. Brien, 1 Md. 438 (1852). Additional decisions will
be found in the 2nd Vol. of Brantly's 1st Maryland Digest under "Principal
and Surety", pp. 1110, 1111.
